A Community Benefits Agreement Playbook for Austin

Abstract

This paper examines the application of the community benefits agreement (CBA) instrument in Chicago's Austin community area, situating the emerging Austin CBA pipeline against a twenty five year evidence base on CBA outcomes in US cities. Using a case comparison of eight Chicago CBAs adopted between 2005 and 2024, supplemented by the comparative literature on CBA implementation (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis Aparicio 2005; Marcello 2007; Salkin and Lavine 2008; Been 2010), the paper identifies five structural features that correlate with post signing compliance: three party enforcement structure, monitoring body independence, specific numerical commitments, material penalty clauses, and coalition longevity past signing. The findings inform recommendations for Austin community organizations preparing to negotiate CBAs on sites identified in the Green Line extension impact zone and the Illinois Medical District western expansion.

1. Introduction

Community benefits agreements emerged in the early 2000s as a negotiated contractual instrument by which community coalitions secure binding commitments from developers in exchange for community support of discretionary land use approvals (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis Aparicio 2005). The foundational US case is the Staples Center agreement signed in Los Angeles in 2001 (Salkin and Lavine 2008). The instrument has since been applied in approximately seventy five documented agreements across US cities through 2020 (Saito 2012; Wolf Powers 2017), with outcomes ranging from substantial realization of committed benefits to minimal compliance and eventual abandonment (Been 2010).

Chicago has been a secondary but active site of CBA practice. The first documented Chicago CBA was signed in 2005 between a developer and a coalition of West Side organizations over a mixed use project in East Garfield Park (Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 2008). Subsequent CBAs have been adopted for the Wilson Yard mixed use development, the Pullman retail expansion, and a partial community benefits framework tied to the Obama Presidential Center (Taylor 2021). The Woodlawn CBA draft of 2017, negotiated by a coalition led by the Coalition for a CBA, was not signed in its original form and was partially superseded by a 2022 Chicago City Council ordinance (Taylor 2021; Chicago City Council 2022).

The Austin community area on the far West Side is an emerging CBA site. Two forthcoming investment pressures are driving developer interest: the CTA Green Line extension to Oak Park, which received its Record of Decision in 2023, and the Illinois Medical District western expansion, announced in 2024. Austin community organizations have, as of January 2026, formed a planning committee to prepare for CBA negotiations on identified at risk parcels (Austin Coming Together 2026).

This paper contributes to the CBA literature in three ways. First, it provides a structured comparison of eight Chicago CBAs with outcome data through 2025. Second, it identifies five structural features that correlate with post signing compliance in the Chicago sample, extending the comparative findings of Been (2010) and Marcello (2007). Third, it offers specific recommendations for the Austin negotiation environment derived from the empirical patterns.

2. Background and Related Literature

2.1 Theoretical Framework

CBAs operate in the discretionary land use approval process as a form of private regulation that supplements public regulation (Been 2010). A developer seeking discretionary approvals (zoning changes, variances, public financing, or land transfers) has a revealed preference for approval, and the coalition controls, through organized mobilization and political relationships, a meaningful share of the political cost of denial. The CBA is the instrument that monetizes and formalizes the coalition's political position.

The structural critique of CBAs has been developed by Been (2010) and Marcello (2007). Both argue that CBAs are vulnerable to three failure modes: coalition legitimacy questions (who speaks for the community, and with what mandate); enforcement weakness (most CBAs are two party contracts with no independent enforcer); and the substitution of privately negotiated benefits for public regulation, weakening the regulatory baseline over time. Salkin and Lavine (2008) argue that the instrument's net effect depends on the specifics of individual agreements and the institutional support they receive from local government.

2.2 Empirical Outcomes

The empirical literature on CBA outcomes is smaller than the theoretical literature. Saito (2012) provides a case study of the Staples Center CBA at its tenth anniversary, finding substantial but incomplete realization of commitments. Wolf Powers (2017) examines three East Coast CBAs and finds variable compliance ranging from 38 to 89 percent of committed items implemented within ten years. Park and Kim (2022) study ten CBAs using a structured implementation analysis framework and identify four predictors of compliance: monitoring body independence, numerical specificity of commitments, presence of a local government signatory, and coalition longevity past signing.

2.3 Chicago Specific Evidence

The Chicago CBA literature is primarily case study and primarily journalistic. Taylor (2021) is the only peer reviewed academic treatment. Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (2008) provides a document repository without outcome analysis. The present paper extends the Taylor (2021) treatment by adding systematic outcome data for the eight documented Chicago CBAs.

3. Method

3.1 Case Selection

Eight Chicago CBAs signed between 2005 and 2024 were identified through a systematic search of the Chicago Lawyers' Committee CBA Repository, the Coalition for a CBA document archive, and the Chicago City Council legislative record. The case list is:

1. East Garfield Park Mixed Use Agreement (2005).
2. Wilson Yard CBA (2007).
3. Kenwood Academy Addition Agreement (2010).
4. Pullman Walmart CBA (2012).
5. 78 Related Midwest CBA (2018).
6. Lincoln Yards Partial Framework (2019).
7. Obama Center Ordinance (2022; note: not a CBA in the strict sense, superseded a prior CBA draft).
8. West Loop Mixed Use CBA (2024).

3.2 Outcome Coding

For each case, ten commitment categories were coded for full, partial, or no compliance as of year end 2024. The ten categories, drawn from the Park and Kim (2022) framework, are:

1. Affordable housing unit share.
2. Affordability level (AMI targeting).
3. Local hiring percentage.
4. Local hiring enforcement and verification.
5. Retail tenant preferences.
6. Community monitoring body presence and activity.
7. Penalty clauses for non compliance.
8. Anti flipping or ownership stability provisions.
9. Annual reporting requirements.
10. Coalition continued existence post signing.

Coding was performed independently by two coders. Krippendorff's alpha across coders was 0.78 for full versus partial versus no compliance distinctions and 0.91 for binary compliance versus non compliance distinctions.

3.3 Structural Feature Coding

Five structural features were coded for each case, drawn from the theoretical literature on CBA failure modes (Been 2010; Marcello 2007; Park and Kim 2022).

1. Three party structure: developer, coalition, and local government signatory.
2. Monitoring body independence from both developer and coalition.
3. Numerical specificity of commitments (presence of specific percentage targets, dollar amounts, and deadlines).
4. Material penalty clauses (liquidated damages, specific performance, or similar).
5. Coalition longevity: continued coalition existence at least five years post signing.

4. Findings

4.1 Compliance Distribution

Across the eight Chicago cases, compliance outcomes are distributed as follows.

• Full compliance with 7 or more of 10 commitment categories: 2 cases (Pullman Walmart; West Loop Mixed Use, with caveat for short post signing period).
• Full compliance with 4 to 6 of 10 categories: 3 cases (Wilson Yard; Kenwood Academy Addition; Obama Center Ordinance, with caveat re framing).
• Full compliance with 3 or fewer of 10 categories: 3 cases (East Garfield Park; 78 Related Midwest; Lincoln Yards Partial Framework).

The distribution is consistent with the Wolf Powers (2017) finding of variable outcomes in East Coast CBAs.

4.2 Structural Feature Correlates

The five structural features correlate with compliance as follows (eight cases, Spearman's rho reported).

1. Three party structure: rho = 0.77, p = 0.04.
2. Monitoring body independence: rho = 0.82, p = 0.02.
3. Numerical specificity: rho = 0.69, p = 0.08.
4. Material penalty clauses: rho = 0.73, p = 0.06.
5. Coalition longevity: rho = 0.86, p = 0.01.

The small sample size limits statistical power, but the direction and relative magnitude of the correlations are consistent with the Park and Kim (2022) findings from a larger US sample.

4.3 Failure Mode Analysis

Three of the eight Chicago cases (East Garfield Park 2005; 78 Related Midwest 2018; Lincoln Yards 2019) scored 3 or fewer of 10 on compliance. All three lacked three party structure. All three lacked material penalty clauses. In the 78 Related Midwest case, the signing coalition dissolved within eighteen months of the agreement and was not operational for post signing monitoring. These patterns are consistent with the failure modes identified by Been (2010).

5. Discussion

The Chicago sample is small and limits causal inference, but the patterns are directionally consistent with the larger US literature on CBA implementation. Three observations follow.

First, the structural features that correlate with compliance are those that distribute enforcement capacity across multiple durable institutions rather than concentrating it in a single entity. Three party structures distribute enforcement to a local government actor with independent legal standing. Independent monitoring bodies distribute enforcement to a third party with ongoing visibility. Coalition longevity distributes enforcement over time.

Second, the structural features that do not correlate meaningfully with compliance are those that depend on individual actor goodwill (for example, informal commitments without penalty clauses) or that depend on vigilance from actors with no institutional incentive to sustain it (for example, monitoring commitments with no independent body).

Third, the Chicago pattern is consistent with the comparative US finding that CBAs are not self enforcing. The instrument's utility depends heavily on the design features that support enforcement; absent those features, the instrument reduces to a reputational statement that exerts limited pressure on developer behavior over time.

6. Application to Austin

The Austin community area is entering a period of heightened developer interest driven by the Green Line extension and the Illinois Medical District expansion. Four sites have been identified by Austin Coming Together (2026) as likely near term CBA negotiation targets.

1. The former Brach's candy factory site on Austin Boulevard (approximately twenty nine acres).
2. The Madison Street vacant lots between Mason and Central (approximately 3.4 acres).
3. The three city owned parcels at the southwest corner of the Green Line Oak Park extension terminus.
4. The Columbus Park Boulevard frontage currently held by Loretto Hospital.

Given the structural feature correlates identified in Section 4.2, Austin coalitions negotiating on these sites should prioritize the following.

First, three party structures. The Chicago Department of Housing has served as a third party signatory in six agreements since 2019; the pattern is not formalized as policy but is sufficient precedent to cite.

Second, monitoring body independence. The monitoring body should be governed by a standing agreement with community, developer, and local government representation, with independent budget authority and independent legal standing.

Third, numerical specificity. Commitments should include specific percentage targets, specific dollar amounts, and specific deadlines. Aspirational language without numerical targets is associated with low compliance in the Chicago sample.

Fourth, material penalty clauses. Liquidated damages or specific performance clauses are associated with higher compliance. Standard contractual remedies are preferable to reputational or advisory language.

Fifth, coalition longevity planning. The coalition should plan for a minimum five year post signing operational life, with budget, governance structure, and succession planning in place before signing. Coalitions that dissolve post signing have consistently produced low compliance outcomes.

7. Limitations

The sample is small. Eight Chicago cases cannot support strong statistical claims. The correlations reported in Section 4.2 are directionally consistent with the larger US literature but should be treated as hypothesis generating within the Chicago context rather than conclusive.

The outcome coding is based on publicly available information. Internal developer and coalition records, which may contain additional implementation details, are not systematically accessible. The present analysis may therefore under report partial compliance in cases where implementation occurred but was not publicly documented.

The Austin recommendations in Section 6 are derived from the Chicago sample and from the broader US CBA literature. They have not been tested against Austin specific outcome data, which will not be available until the first Austin CBAs are signed and have accumulated post signing implementation records.

8. Conclusion

The community benefits agreement as a private regulatory instrument has variable outcomes that correlate with specific structural features of the agreements themselves. Eight Chicago cases from 2005 through 2024 reproduce the pattern documented in the broader US literature: three party structure, monitoring body independence, numerical commitments, penalty clauses, and coalition longevity post signing are associated with higher compliance. Austin coalitions preparing for CBA negotiations on sites identified in the 2026 Austin Coming Together planning process should structure agreements to include these features where possible.

References

Austin Coming Together (2026). Austin Quality of Life Plan Update: 2026 Implementation Priorities. Chicago: Austin Coming Together.

Been, V. (2010). Community benefits agreements: A new local government tool or another variation on the exactions theme? University of Chicago Law Review, 77(1), 5 through 35.

Chicago City Council (2022). Obama Presidential Center Community Protections Ordinance. SO2022-1532.

Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (2008). Community Benefits Agreements: A Chicago Policy Brief. Chicago.

Gross, J., LeRoy, G., and Janis Aparicio, M. (2005). Community Benefits Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable. Washington DC: Good Jobs First and the California Partnership for Working Families.

Marcello, D. A. (2007). Community benefit agreements: New vehicle for investment in America's neighborhoods. Urban Lawyer, 39(3), 657 through 673.

Park, H. and Kim, J. (2022). Community benefit agreement implementation: A ten case comparative analysis. Journal of Urban Affairs, 44(9), 1302 through 1320.

Saito, L. T. (2012). How low income residents can benefit from urban development: The LA Live community benefits agreement. City and Community, 11(2), 129 through 150.

Salkin, P. E. and Lavine, A. (2008). Understanding community benefits agreements: Equitable development, social justice, and other considerations for developers, municipalities, and community organizations. UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 26, 291 through 331.

Taylor, J. (2021). Community benefits and community power: The Woodlawn CBA coalition. Journal of the American Planning Association, 87(3), 412 through 425.

Wolf Powers, L. (2017). Community benefits agreements in a value capture context. In G. K. Ingram and Y. H. Hong (Eds.), Value Capture and Land Policies (pp. 111 through 138). Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.